Proposers strategically formulate legislative bills before voting takes place. However, spatial voting models that estimate legislator's ideological preferences do not explicitly consider this fact. In our model, proposers determine the ideology and valence of legislative bills to maximize their objective functions. Approaching to the median legislator ideology and increasing costly valence increases the passing probability, but usually decreases the proposer's payoff. Using quantile utility proposer preferences, the model becomes tractable and estimable. In this way, we deal with the bill sample selection problem to estimate legislator's preferences and also, the ideology of proposers, the proposed valence change, and the ideological stance of the statu quo in a common scale. Using Chilean Senate 2009 -2011 roll call data, our results suggests that (1) political party affiliation significantly affects Senators' ideology, (2) popular, young and male Senators are more extremist, and (3) proposers during Bachelet and Piñera's terms have similar ideologies.
Introduction
Bill proposers typically choose the content of proposals to obtain legislators' support.
Proposers jointly consider several variables to have a bill passed, including the current statu quo, the distribution of political forces in the Congress, and the institutional setup. In this paper, we provide a simple and estimable model of the legislative process, in which strategic proposers select bills' characteristics considering their effects on the voting behavior of legislators.
We essentially merge in a tractable model a simple agenda-setting process with a spatial legislative voting setup. We explicitly incorporate a strategic bill proposing stage to appropriately estimate the ideological preferences considering the proposer's endogenous choice of bills. Upon some parametric assumptions, our model provides a richer analysis of the legislative process in comparison to alternative setups.
Formal models of law-making represent legislators' preferences and bills in a multidimensional space of attributes. However, when estimating models, the related literature implicitly assumes that bills actually put for legislators' consideration are just randomly drawn from an unspecified set of possible proposals. A sensible model should consider that the observed legislative voting process takes place after the proposer strategically selects bills. Following Peress (forthcoming) , in a typical one-dimensional setting as ours, there may exist a gridlock or even a censoring interval for a given proposal. In reality, a strategic proposer avoids presenting an bill with slim chances of passing. Thus, as researchers, we never consider how legislators vote for the unobserved bill when estimating models of legislative behavior. Hence, observed bills are a subset of potential proposals with relatively high likelihood of approval, as suggested by Clinton and Meirowitz (2001) . Heckman (1976) pioneered the analysis of statistical models under non-random sample selection. However, unlike classical applications in labor economics, we do not observe characteristics of never proposed bills, so that Heckman's approach is unfeasible. Instead, the law-making process is a sample selection mechanism on its own. Integrating it into the process would make it possible to estimate legislators' preferences and other features characterizing the legislative process.
The basic setup of our model is similar to classic spatial voting models (Poole and Rosenthal 1985 , Londregan 2000a , Poole 2005 which ignore sample selection con-siderations.
1 Our setup includes a strategic proposal stage implying additional constraints that allow us to recover proposal and statu quo locations, and to provide a more fleshed setup of the legislative process. The legislators and the proposer have preferences on the ideological spatial location (left or right) of the bill and on its valence. The latter concept has been primarily used in electoral models as a representation of candidate-specific characteristics, such as charisma or competence, that appeal to all voters (see Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987 , 1990 , and Groseclose 2001 . In our paper, valence measures the quality of a proposal which represents universally desirable goals of legislation such as coherence and efficiency cost-effectiveness. Thus, our interpretation of valence is closer to the ones used by Londregan (2000b) and Hirsch and Shotts (2011) .
Most of the previous literature has assumed that valence is exogenously given (with the exception of Hirsch and Shotts 2011) . Londregan (2000b) discusses the strategic use of valence by the executive power, but in his empirical estimations, he considers the valence as a fixed attribute of the proposer. Arguably, in real legislative process valence is endogenous.
The proposer, either the executive power or a group of legislators, strategically exerts effort to increase the valence and the likelihood of approval, considering costs and benefits involved. Moreover, in developing countries the executive power is able to provide more valence to bills than legislators because of its advantage in term of resources and capabilities (Londregan 2000b ).
Formally, the legislative game consists of two stages. First, a proposer defines the proposal's ideological stance and the valence with two potentially conflicting goals: to make it as close as possible to his own ideological position, and to increase the probability that the bill gets approved. By generating sufficient valence, the proposer may make the Congress to approve bills that are distant from the median voter ideology. At the second stage, the legislators vote to accept or to reject the proposal. In the latter case, the statu quo policy remains.
While sensible, this approach is untractable if we use standard expected utility (Von Neumann-Morgensten) preferences because the probability of passing a bill roughly requires 2 V ¡1 calculations, where V stands for the number of voters. However, if the proposer has a different kind of preferences, focusing on quantiles of possible outcomes instead of expected 1 A large literature devoted its attention to the estimation of spatial voting models for the US Congress.
More recent work has focus on the Supreme Court (Martin and Quinn 2006; Peress 2009) , and Latin American chambers Londregan (2000a Londregan ( , 2000b ; Desposato 2006 values (Manski 1988; Rostek 2010) , the model becomes tractable. While this approach may sound too sophisticated, it is indeed much simpler than expected utility because it delivers a surprisingly easy problem to solve for a proposer: he only needs to maximize his own preference under a median voter approval restriction with a fixed probability. One important issue on the model identification is the impossibility of recovering ideological positioning of all the usual parameters of interest, i.e. the ideology of preferences and voted bills (Rivers 2003) . We go beyond putting some restrictions or normalizations to secure identification by using an index parametrization strategy as in Londregan (2000a) .
This allows us to economize in the degrees of freedom, but also to obtain evidence on the determination of legislator preferences, importance of bills, and the statu quo. For the sake of comparison, we also pursue the usual approach of estimating fixed ideological preferred points of legislators.
We take the model to the data using roll-call data from the Chilean Senate during Our results show that political party affiliation is the most relevant determinant of Senators' ideologies. By using our parameterization of indices, we find evidence of greater extremism in male, young, and highly voted Senators, especially for the Center-right.
We also estimate fixed ideological effects for each Senator, with reasonable precision of bootstrapped confidence intervals. Nevertheless, our preferred parameterized approach provides some novel insights of the ideology stance of Senators.
The results for the median voter, statu quoand proposer's ideology taking together suggest that the ideological scenario between Bachelet's and Piñera's periods did not change by much. The evidence could be interpreted in the way suggested by certain rightists Senators: Piñera's government has been quite close to the ideological stance of Center-left parties. The model's measurement of differential valence generated by proposers decreases after Piñera takes office, which may be attributed to the difficulties the first center-right government in 20 years, or to the great 8.8 Richter earthquake in central Chile occurred 12 days before Piñera's government started. Finally, our measurement of the ideological evolution of the statu quo suggests that Senate support for the previous bill moves the statu quo to the left during Bachelet's term, but has a less clear effect during Piñera's term. This finding is in line with the evidence on ideological preferences of proposers during the last period.
Our road map is the following: in the next section we present the model. In Section ??
we consider its estimation. In Section 4 we present the empirical findings. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
Model
In our setting, we assume that each proposal can be described as a combination of two characteristics: an ideological position, typically a left-right political position; and a proposal quality component known as valence. Londregan (2000a) , Rivers (2003) and Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers (2004) point out that the traditional spatial model voting in the political science literature is unidentified. Since in these models there are two relevant dimensions per proposal, ideology and valence, it is generally impossible to learn whether a proposal is preferred due to a high valence, or because it strongly confronts extremist ideological positions. Londregan (2000b) uses these insights to analyze voting data from the Chilean Congress Committees.
However, in spite of the advances made by these works, an unappealing implicit assumption in Londregan's estimating procedure is that proposals put for voting are randomly drawn from a possible universe of them, or that every proposer will blindly advocate bills regardless of their possibility of approval. It is common sense that professional politicians assess the likelihood of approval of any proposal before putting it for others' scrutiny. This means that: (i) the data on actual proposals is actually a non random sample of possible proposals and, consequently, the estimators relying on the aforementioned assumptions are biased; and (ii) we can use proposers' behavior, as well as voting behavior, to learn about legislator's preferences and other influencing factors.
Hence, the executive power in particular, and any proposer in general, wants to maximize two potentially conflicted dimensions of a proposal: (i) closeness to a preferred ideological point and (ii) probability of passing the proposal. We assume that the executive power or other proposers perfectly know the legislators preferred ideological points.
Consider that a proposer i, who can be either a legislator or the executive power, 
where CÔq p Õ is an increasing, weakly convex cost function of providing valence; z s , q s are the ideological position and valence of the statu quo; and P ÔX, z p , q p Õ is the probability of approval of the proposal which depends on the vector of ideological preferred points of all committee members X Ôx 1 , x 2 , ..., x V Õ and on the proposals characteristics Ôz p , q p Õ.
A problem with the previous specification is that the probability of the proposal passes P ÔX, z p , q p , z s , q s Õ is a mathematical object which is very hard to compute. The fact that the individual-voter probability of approval varies across legislators is the greatest complication.
2 To see the complexity, we elaborate this probability further.
where F is the cumulative distribution of the idiosyncratic shock. Computing the above formula rapidly increases in complexity as the number of voters grows. Roughly, this
if V is odd and M 
A more tractable setup
Instead of relying on the traditional Von NeumannMorgenstern expected utility theory of decision making, we propose a different kind of preferences that provides a much more 2 Notice that if we assume that the proposer does not know the preferred ideological points would make our problem easier. However, in this setting seems unlikely because legislators have a well-known political affiliation.
tractable model in this case. It also describes a simpler and probably more realistic decisionmaking process of the bill proponent, which is the maximization of a particular quantile of the expected utility conditional on a particular median voter. This kind of behavior entails loss risk aversion defined by the level of targeted quantile in the distribution. Proponents who are willing reduce the risk of loss, target a higher quantile by modifying their choices accordingly. A complete treatment of this general theory could be found in Rostek (2010) with an ancestor in Manski (1988) .
Our setup assumes that the proposer already knows who the median voter is before deciding on the ideology and valence of the bill. Since the proposer cares about a quantile and the distribution of the utility, the specific ranking is irrelevant to the decision as long as the median voter remains unchanged. In this setting, the proposer avoids the complex calculation of the approval probability of the bill. He only needs to compute the probability of that the median voter approves, a much simpler object. Instead of considering all possible rankings, the proposer determines a pair Ôq p , z p Õ, that maximizes a quantile a of the expected utility random variable. In other words, the proposer ensures an ex ante probability of approval a given the valence costs, its preferred ideology x i , and the preferred ideology of the pivotal legislator, x m .
Since the problem is static, we do not use time subscripts t although the statu quo 
where F is the cumulative distribution of the idiosyncratic shock of the median voter. This problem can is equivalent to max zp,qp 0
In particular, if we choose the traditional spatial linear-quadratic utility function (as in Londregan 2000a) and a linear cost function, we solve a Lagrangian to characterize the proposer's behavior
From the first-order conditions, the solution Ôz ¦ p , q ¦ p Õ necessarily satisfies the following con-
A well-defined maximum is defined whenever 0 aη 1.
replace the proposal z ¦ p and valence q ¦ p , we find the voter v votes aye if
where the second step follows from substituting (2) into the previous equation. Since it is hard to identify the parameter η, we set it to the value of 1. Therefore, if we consider that idiosyncratic shocks follow a standard normal distribution, the probability of the voter approves a particular bill is
Taking the model to the data
Essentially, x v for v 1, ..., V are individual fixed effects in a non-linear model in the usual jargon of panel data econometrics. Without loss of generality, we denote these parameters by a linear index of observed variables
In the particular case of individual fixed effects K V and the variables l 1 , ..., l V are dichotomic variables taking 1 for voter k and 0 otherwise. However, following the insight of Londregan (2000a) , we could also use a more economic parametrization by modeling individual preferences in terms of observable voters' characteristics, such as political party, age, gender, etc. Since this strategy allows us to a substantial reduction of the parameters to estimate, it is likely to improve our mean squared error in finite samples. Given this setup, the ideological point of the median or pivotal voter is medÔx v Õ x m ξl m .
Proposer's preferences x i and time-varying statu quo z s could be parameterized similarly. Hence, x i ϕr i and z s,t πs t . Finally, we could also try to parameterize the probability of winning, which should depend on characteristics of the bill voted. In this case, since the probability has to be bounded between 0 and 1, we rather model the quantile of the distribution, i.e Φ ¡1 ÔaÕ y δu t . We also have to restrict the product aη ΦÔyÕη to be bounded between 0 and 1. One simple way to do this is by substituting constraining η 1.
Using all this nomenclature, we could write the complete likelihood in terms of the non-linear index θ itv Ôw, βÕ with w itv Ôl v , r i , s t , u t Õ as the vector of observable variables and β Ôξ, ϕ, π, δ, ψÕ as the vector of parameters.
where d itv is a dummy variable with value 1 whether the voter approves the bill, and 0 otherwise. As econometricians, we ignore who the pivotal voter considered by the proposer 
Identification
The structure of the model shows that there is no natural scale for ideological preferences, nor natural ideological direction of preferences, as stated by Rivers (2003) . In order to achieve identification, one usually needs to normalize certain parameters of the model. Rivers (2003) shows that in a one-dimensional setting, two independently linear constraints are needed to achieve identification. In our model we choose to constrain the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic shock to 1 (as any other probit model) and to normalize the median voter to an arbitrary value. The latter requires to normalize constants of the linear indices of our model.
The basic equation describing approval or rejection of a bill can be written as
which depends on three linear indices x v ¡x m , x i ¡x m , and z s ¡x m . Since x m is constant for a legislative period (or for a period with an invariant composition of legislators), it is just a constant in these indices that can be set to an arbitrary value. This is true without loss of generality since there is no natural metric for the space of ideological preferences. Then, after estimating x v as a linear combination of relevant legislator's characteristics (with no constant term), the value of the index can be adjusted by adding a constant A so that the index median coincides with our arbitrary value x m . Hence if the median of our estimated preferences ism, then we need the following relation medÔξl v AÕ m A x m . The latter clearly implies that A x m ¡m.
The situation becomes subtler when there are two or more legislative terms, each one with a potentially different median voter, as it happens in our sample. We handle this case by computing the median voter value for the second period after normalizing the median voter ideology of the first term to x 1 m . Hence, the constant A is computed using the following logic To be consistent, the median voter of the second term is constrained to be x 2 m . Note that we implicitly constraint the median value for other terms by imposing an arbitrary value for the median of the first term.
Once the constant terms of the indices are normalized as explained above, the rest of the identification analysis consists in showing that the parameters of the model can be uniquely determined given data characteristics and an infinite sample size. Rothenberg (1971) shows that a model is point-identified if the information matrix of the joint density of the observations is of complete rank. Since our model is essentially a probit model with a non-linear index, the information matrix in this case is
β ½ is a positive-definite matrix, Rothenberg's condition is met. The latter is guaranteed if the index gradient vector contains linearly independent items. Hence Rothenberg's result is useful because it shows that lack of identification will generate a singular information/Hessian matrix and no maximum likelihood estimator exists. If we can obtain a non-singular Hessian, the model must be point-identified.
An additional problem arises when the number of voters V is relatively large with respect to T , the number of elections. We face what is called the "incidental parameter"
problem. Intuitively speaking, it is hard to accurately estimate a large number of individual ideological fixed effects while we have a reduced number of observations per legislator. The problem is even exacerbated when statu quo estimates (equivalent to time fixed effects) are also requested, as the traditional approach demands Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers (2004) ). We believe this viewpoint is simply unrealistic: the incidental parameter problem essentially tells us that there is a trade-off between the amount of information we can learn from the data and its precision. In our view, the current approach advocates a nearly useless agnostic solution. With a tighter parametrization in the spirit of Londregan 
Chilean Senate Legislative Procedure
Legislative bills can be proposed by the President or by a group of congressmen. The law establishes that bills on certain subjects must exclusively been proposed by the President, including budgetary issues. It is well-known that the 1980 Constitution in Chile establishes a strong presidential system, in which the President has remarkable influence over the legislative process.
A bill must be initially presented to the Senate or to the chamber of Representatives.
The initial chamber is named the original one. The other chamber becomes the bill reviewer. Bills on certain subjects (budget, public administration, etc.) must necessarily be presented to a particular chamber.
The first round at the original chamber starts when the bill is globally analyzed by the appropriate subject committee, which reports to the chamber. The conclusions contain a discussion of the bill and whether it is suitable or not as an admissible legislative idea and potential suggested modifications made by the President or congressmen. Once the debate finishes, the legislators vote the bill if the constitutional quorum requirement is met. If the bill is approved with modifications, it is sent again to the subject committee for a new, more detailed analysis. Once this is done, a second report is presented to the chamber. At this point, three possible outcomes may occur. (a) The chamber totally approves the bill, and passes it on to the reviewer chamber; (b) The chamber globally approves, but makes modifications to be incorporated to the reviewer chamber's consideration; or (c) the bill is totally rejected.
The second legislative round starts once the bill is presented to the reviewer chamber.
Subject committees do an analysis process that is similar to the first round. The reviewer chamber can approve, modify or reject the bill. In the first case, the bill is sent to the President for his or her approval. If there are modifications, the bill is sent to the original chamber for its consideration in a third legislative round. A joint committee of members of both chambers (comisión mixta) is appointed in case the reviewer chamber rejects the bill in the second round, or if the original chamber rejects the modified bill in the third round.
In our analysis, we explicitly consider the procedural information to identify the bill's proposer at each stage. We also consider that first, second or third legislative round as well as quorum requirements are determinants of the bill importance index, y. Hence, our model allows for a proposer who changes the probability of winning according to the bill's characteristics.
Results
We report specifications (1) to (5) in Tables 5 and 6 . Our preferred specification is (4) which includes several Senators' characteristics to explain the ideological preferences.
Ideological preferences: In order to estimate equation (4), we propose variables that can account for the ideological stance of the senators, denoted by x v . A natural candidate is the political party affiliation. We consider the parties with the highest number of Senators (UDI, RN, PDC, PS, PRSD, PPD, and MAS) and omit dummy variables for non-affiliated ones (independent). A broad view of the results shows that UDI and RN obtain values higher than the median voter ideology in Bachelet's term (normalized at 1). Hence, the larger the number, the more right-wing oriented. Since specification (5) in Table 5 includes senator fixed effects, we only report these estimates graphically in Figure 4 . The ideological scale is reversed, but we have turned upside down to ease the interpretation. The overall estimation of this Senator ideology index of our preferred specification (4) For specification (2)- (4) we also considered Senators' age, age-squared and gender. We also interacted these variables with the Alianza dummy (Center-right coalition composed by UDI and RN) in order to capture gender and age-specific patterns of ideological stance.
The results show that Alianza's male Senators are more right-wing oriented than their female counterparts. It also appears a milder extremist effect of center-left male Senators, even though it is not robust in all specifications. The effects of age suggest that the younger the Senator, the more extreme his/her ideological preferred point is (i.e. rightist leaning towards right and leftists doing the opposite). Since the quadratic age term has the opposite sign to the linear age term, the aging moderation process decays for older
Senators.
In the case of specifications (3) and (4) But there is a complicated issue: the government has not made them with a political positioning which is proper of our side" (translation is ours). A recent book by Novoa "Con la Fuerza de la Libertad" (With the force of the freedom) also stresses these critiques.
statu quo index, and the bill proposer index for our preferred specification. The proposer's index clearly shifts to the left on average. The statu quo index also shifts to the left. In this way, the bill ideology index -according to the model a varying weighted average of median voter and proposer's ideology-marginally shifts to the left.
Importance Index: The variables in this index y measure the relative importance given by the proposer to the bill. It can also be interpreted as a relative high value-tocost ratio for generating valence. In line to our expectations, absolute quorum or nosimple quorum requirements increase the index. This, in turn, implies that these bills have larger approval probability because the proposer cares more about them and is willing to provide larger valence. The estimates also suggest that first-round voting is more important that second-or third-round (which appear with negative sign). Finally, particular bills marginally increase the importance index; voting articles, appointments or agreements tend to generate negative effects, especially in the last case. The evolution of importance over time is depicted in Figure 3 . This does not show a systematic difference between both legislative periods.
Statu quo: To estimate equation (4), we determine a set of time varying variables that represent a sensible measure of the ideological perception of the statu quo. One natural choice is the President approval percentage that is widely communicated through the media. Several poll companies generate different indices. We picked the one generated by Adimark 7 . We introduce this presidential popularity variable alone and interacting with a dummy for Piñera's term so that we capture the potentially ideological opposite effect on the statu quo once a Center-right President is in office. Given the high presidential power in the Legislative process in Chile, we try to explain the statu quo index by the result of the previous legislative voting. We interacted this variable with a dummy for Piñera's term to allow for a reverse effect in this case. We also coded an "current theme" dummy which subjectively label bill projects in this way. 8 Our approach substantially differs from the traditional Political Science ones, surveyed by Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers (2004) .
Those estimates attempt to measure the statu quo as a pure policy location parameter (e.g. an election fixed effect) with considerable less precision.
In all the specifications, the results show that a higher voting in the Senate for the last 7 See in www.adimark.cl 8 Exact definition of this variable is available on request.
bill moves the statu quo to the left during the first period examined, i.e. in favor of the ideology of President Bachelet. The effect of the previous bill share of voting is less clear for the second term. At best, a larger support to a bill moves the statu quo to the left less than it does during Bachelet's term. On the other hand, the popular approval of the President tends to move the statu quo to the right, except for the case of specification (5).
Current topics shift the statu quo to the left. 9 Considering the results obtained regarding the ideological stance of proposers during Piñera's term, the result of moving the statu quo to the left when a bill is approved may not be contradictory at all. Our results suggest that proposers during Piñera's term are relatively inclined to leftist positions with respect to the ideology of many Center-right Senators. Some politicians of Bachelet's government have recognized they should have implemented certain public policies done in Piñera's term.
10
Differential Valence: Figure 3 depicts the differential valence q p ¡ q s computed according to equation (2). Our estimates show that the differential valence is negative in many cases for both periods, especially Piñera's term. It is remarkable that just after Piñera's took office the differential valence went down for a large magnitude. This may suggest a certain drop in quality or in ideological consensus during that period. The latter may be plausible since Piñera's government face particularly difficult circumstances just after took office. Since it was the first Center-right government after 20 years of Concertación was in office, Piñera faced some problems to appoint new authorities to run the government. In addition, Piñera had to manage an extraordinary social demand after the 8.8 Richter earthquake in Central Chile on February 27th, 2010. These circumstances may have diverted government and Congress efforts from the generation of bill quality or consensus due to the emergency, or it may have caused a particularly high cost for generating valence.
Conclusions
We have presented a formal procedure for estimating spatial models of voting by considering the strategic nature of the ideological setting of the proposals and their associated valence.
9 Exact definition of this variable is available on request. 10 For instance in an interview in Radio Cooperativa on March 30th, 2010, Francisco Vidal, a former
Secretary under Lagos and Bachelet governments asserted that the Concertación governments were not brave enough to raise profit tax rates once Piñera proposed this to finance reconstruction works after the earthquake in Central Chile.
This approach departs in several ways from the previous literature. We formally introduce a simple theory of strategic agenda setting, considering the configuration of political forces, institutional arrangements, and the statu quo. The result is a simple model that provides a characterization of several issues involved in the legislative process, but it is still amenable for estimation.
On technical grounds, we apply the theory of quantile maximization preferences to obtain an insightful and estimable non linear probit model. Our results are fairly intuitive. The optimal proposer's strategy is to generate a bill's ideology which is a weighted average between her own preferred point and the median voter's one. We allow for bill heterogeneity. The more important a bill is, the greater the weight on proposer's ideology, and the larger the valence generated. In our view, this theoretical construction proposes a structural sample selection mechanism of bills that has not been previously addressed by the literature, to the best of our knowledge. This sample selection mechanism is pervasive in many problems in social sciences, especially in Economics since the seminal work of Heckman (1976) . Using the structure of the model, we can learn the evolution of the ideology of proponents, bill proposals, statu quo, as well as the importance of bills and the differential valence.
In our empirical application, we use roll-call data from the Chilean Senate from March 2009 to March 2011, covering two legislative terms: the last year of M. Bachelet and the first year of S. Piñera, both with different proposers and a different Senate composition.
We follow the more realistic strategy of Londregan (2000a) consisting of parameterizing the Senator ideology, the proposers ideology, the statu quo, and the importance of bills, as linear indices of observable variables. The structure of the model itself corrects the sample selection problem in contrast to more general, but somewhat impractical empirical models advocated in this literature (Poole and Rosenthal 1985; Heckman and Snyder Jr 1997; Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers 2004 ) that try to identify fixed ideological points of legislators and bills at the same time. Our setup, in contrast, stresses the strategic behavior of proponents and incorporates it into a simple structurally estimated model. 
